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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law--Constitutionality of Conscientious Objector Exemption From Military Service Upheld-Construction of the Test of Religious

Training and Belief for Exemption.--In the three cases involved,' the parties
claimed exemption from military service on the ground of conscientious objection as provided in the Universal Military Training and Service Act. 2 The
claim of each was denied. Upon refusal to submit to induction into the armed

forces, each party was indicted and convicted of violating the Universal Military

Training and Service Act.3 The three cases were consolidated for argument and

decision inasmuch as each challenged the constitutionality of the exemption

clause.4 The United States Supreme Court held that the test of religious belief

was not intended to be restricted to the conventional theism, but rather was
to be interpreted broadly. United States v. Seegcr, 3S0 U.S. 163 (1965).

Recognition of the existence of those who, through a reading of the Bible5

or otherwise,0 are conscientiously opposed to bearing arms in military service7
has been part of our national history since the Colonial Period.8 However,
until the Selective Service Act of 1917,0 little was known of the conscientious
1. United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963), aftd, 3S0 U.S. 163 (1965);

Peter v. United States, 324 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 3SO U.S. 163 (1965); United
States v. Seeger, 216 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 194), aWd,
3S0 U.S. 163 (1965).
2. 62 Stat. 609 (1943), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (195S).
3. 62 Stat. 622 (194S), 50 U.S.C. App. § 462 (195S).
4. The Court notes, however, that the cases are factually different. United States v.
Seeger, 3S0 U.S. 163, 165 (1965).
5. See, e.g., Exodus 20:13; Isaiah 2:4; 1 John 3:15; Matthew 5:3S-43.
6. The conscientious objector is normally denominated as either religious, ethical, or
political. See AMittlebeeler, Law and the Conscientious Objector, 20 Ore. L. Rev. 301, 305-07
(1941).
7. See generally Gray, Character "Bad"--The Story of a Conscientious Objector (1934);
Sibley & Jacob, Conscription of Conscience (1952); Thomas, The Conscientious Objector in
America (1923); Doty, Central Committee of Conscientious Objectors, Bibliography of Conscientious Objection to War (1954).
S. See generally IIacintosh v. United States, 42 F.2d 345, S47-4S (2d Cir. 1930), rev'd
on other grounds, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 US.
245, 266-67 (1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring). For a history of conscientious objector
provisions in this country, see Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the

Light of Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 Geo. L.J. 252, 256-63 (1963); Russell, Development of
Conscientious Objector Recognition in the United States, 20 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 409, 412-29
(1952). "The religious objectors, as a group, have consistently been given some typa of
exemption or deferment from the operation of the draft la.... The ethical objector has
not generally been given any consideration. Neither the Legislature nor the Courts have felt
any compassion for the position of the political objector." Russell, supra at 411. (Footnote
omitted.) For a detailed study of conscientious objection, see Cornell, The Conscientious
Objector and the Law (1943); Kellogg, The Conscientious Objector (1919); Wright,
Conscientious Objectors in the Civil War (1931).
9. Act of May 13, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76.
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objector in this country. 10 That act provided for exemption from combatant
duty, but restricted its availability to those who showed membership in a
this exemption requirement was
recognized pacifist sect." The stringency of
2
somewhat ameliorated by Executive Order.1
The constitutionality of the 1917 Draft Act was questioned in the Selective
Draft Law Cases. 3 In declaring that act constitutional, the United States
Supreme Court summarily dismissed the argument that the exemption clause
14
was violative of the first amendment's establishment and free exercise clauses.
The Burke-Wadsworth Conscription Bill' 5 was enacted prior to World War
II as the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.10 Although it broadened
the statutory ground for conscientious objector exemption,' 1 it was the basis
for much heated discussion.' 8 In 1943, Judge Augustus Hand, in United States
v. Kauten,'9 went beyond the issue in the case 20 to state that, under the 1940
exemption provision, the proper distinction to be made was between those who
oppose a particular war and those who oppose war at all times and under any
10. Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 Colum. U.Q. 253 (1919).
11. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 78. For a list of religious organizations
recognized as pacifist during World War I, see Note, 15 St. John's L. Rev. 235, 236 & n.20
(1941). The views of individual sects known as pacifist are discussed in Brooks & Leach,
Help Wanted! The Experiences of Some Quaker Conscientious Objectors (1940); Hershberger, The Mennonite Church in the Second World War (1951) ; Tietz, Jehovah's Witnesses:
Conscientious Objectors, 28 So. Cal. L. Rev. 123 (1955).
12. Exec. Order No. 2823, March 20, 1918, which, while stipulating the noncombatant
services to which objectors could be assigned, extended the exemption to include those who,
although they were not members of recognized pacifist sects, possessed conscientious scruples
against service in the armed forces.
13. 245 U.S. 366 (1918), 4 Iowa L. Bull. 122.
14. "[W]e pass without anything but statement the proposition that an establishment of
a religion or an interference with the free exercise thereof repugnant to the First Amendment resulted from the exemption clauses of the act . . .because we think its unsoundness
is too apparent to require us to do more." 245 U.S. at 389-90. Contra, Black, The Selective
Draft Cases--A Judicial Milepost on the Road to Absolutism, 11 B.U.L. Rev. 37 (1931).
15. S.4164, H.R. 10132, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). For a discussion of the bill In Its
original form and its subsequent evolution, see Conklin, supra note 8, at 269-70.
16. 54 Stat. 885.
17. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889. This
act did not limit exemption to members of recognized pacifist sects, but rather extended
it to any person "who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed
to participation in war in any form." Ibid. But see Cornell, Exemption From the Draft: A
Study in Civil Liberties, 56 Yale L.J. 258, 267 (1947), where the 1940 act is criticized as
inadequate, and the English system for such exemption is cited with approval. For the
English law, see The National Service Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 64, §§ 17-19 (1948).
18. See Hearings on S.4164 Before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. 1 (1940); Hearings on H.R. 10132 Before the House Committee on Military Affairs,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940).
19. 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
20. Waite, Section 5(g) of the Selective Service Act, As Amended by the Court, 29 Minn.
L. Rev. 22, 24-25 (1944).
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form.21 His view was that only the latter was entitled to exemption.2- Subsequent Second Circuit cases reaffirmed this reasoning.P
The broad construction applied to the 1940 exemption provision in the
Second Circuit was not accepted in the Ninth Circuit, where, in Berman v.
United States,24 the court of appeals took a narrower view of the test. Noting
the similarity, at least in principle, between the situations in the Second Circuit
cases and in Bernuan, the court stated that it took "divergent views from those
expressed in those cases."' 25 Judge Stephens pointed out that the concept of
deity was necessary in order that the objector's beliefs could be said to be
religious and that "before one comes within the exemption provided in the
Act, he must be opposed to war not only by reason of his religious belief but
by reason of religious training."26 Since the Berman decision, the explicit statutory requirement of "religious training" under the 1940 act has been overlooked
both by Congress2 7 and by the courts.
The Berman view of the "religious belief" requisite was adopted by Congress28 when it enacted the Universal Military Training and Service Act in
19489 In that act, Congress defined the troublesome phrase, "religious training
and belief," as meaning "in this connection ... an individual's belief in a relation
to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical
views or a merely personal moral code." 3 This statutory clarification seemingly
removed the problem of interpreting the test, but it makes no mention in its
definition of the "religious training" requisite.
During the decade and a half following the 1948 Draft Act, the courts of
the Second, 3 ' Third, 32 and Ninth 3 Circuits construed the statute in keeping
133 F.2d at 70S (dictum).
Ibid. Judge Hand stated further that opposition to war at all times and under any
form is an objection which "may justly be regarded as a response of the individual to an
inward mentor, call it conscience or God, that is for many persons at the prezent time the
equivalent of what has always been thought a religious impulse." Ibid. Under Kauten, such
objectors would have come within the exemption. But see Waite, supra note 20, at
26, where it is said that "some of us who wish this were the law are convincd-regretfulythat it is not." For his reasons for disagreeing with Judge Hand, sce Waite, supra note
20, at 27-35. See Lane, "Conscientiously Opposed," "By Reason of Religious Training and
Belief," As Used in the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, 31 Geo. L.J. C0 (1942).
23. United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt, 141 F.2d S45 (2d Cir. 1944); United State3 ex
rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
24. 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
25. Id. at 378.
26. Id. at 3M2.
27. See the definition of "religious training and belief" in the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 609 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958).
28. S. Rep. No. 1268, Soth Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1943).
29. 62 Stat. 604 (194S), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-73 (195S).
30. 62 Stat. 613 (1943), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1953).
31. United States v. Bendik, 220 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1955).
32. See United States v. De Lime, 223 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1955).
33. Etcheverry v. United States, 320 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 930
21.

22.
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with the criteria set down in Berman. In each of these cases, the constitutionality
of the exemption clause was upheld.
However, the objectors had not yet surrendered in their assault upon the
so-called "Supreme Being Clause" of the 1948 act. In the past three years, three
cases34 arose which culminated in the Seeger decision. Ironically, these cases
emanated from the Second and Ninth Circuits, as did the "Kauten line" and
Berman.
The final curtain was brought down on the trilogy of Seeger, Jakobson and
Peter in the highest Court when Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the Court, held
that the test under the exemption clause is "a sincere and meaningful belief
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the
God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption . . . ."3 Thus, the
United States Supreme Court, with one fell swoop of its judicial ax, gave a
new ring to the word "religious" as it is to be viewed by the courts.a0 The
Court's reinterpretation of this word was veiled in an 8outpouring of erudite
quotations from Tillich and other "modern" theologians.
However, the Court had a purpose in radically redefining the term, for, in
this way, it could avoid the issues raised by the recent first amendment cases' 8
and, more especially, by Torcaso v. Watkins,39 where, after stating that "neither
a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person 'to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion,' ",40 the Court noted that there are
religions which are not predicated upon a conventional belief in God. 41 In
addition to the first amendment problems which would arise under the Berman
view of the test, a problem would present itself as to the denial of due process
which is guaranteed by the fifth amendment. In fact, the court of appeals in
Seeger held that the exemption clause was violative of the due process guarantee
42
in that it established an impermissible classification.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out that, if the Court
(1963) ; Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882 (1956);
George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843 (1952).
34. Cases cited note 1 supra.
35. 380 U.S. at 176.
36. In United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), the Court used the traditional
view of the word "religion": "The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation." Id. at 633-34 (Hughes, C. J.,
dissenting).
37. 380 U.S. at 180-83.
38. School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
39. 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (Maryland notary public oath case). See Conklin, supra note
8, at 276-81.
40. 367 U.S. at 495.
41. Id. at 495 n.11, where the Court states that, among such religions, there are several In
this country: Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular Humanism.
42. United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 854 (2d Cir. 1964), 52 Geo. L.J. 618, 18
Rutgers L. Rev. 924.
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had not interpreted the exemption clause as it did, there would have been
difficulties in regard to both the first and fifth amendments.4 3
It is a fundamental rule of the judicial process that a statute should be
construed so as not to draw its constitutionality into question,44 but one cannot in justice excuse the Court's failure to meet the real issue-the possible
violation either of the free exercise or establishment clauses of the first amendment or of the due process guarantee of the fifth amendment.s The Court was
careful to note, however, that none of the individuals involved were atheists
and that it was not deciding that question."
The Court avoided the Bermnan problem by viewing the Senate report47 on
the 1948 act in such a way as to conclude that, "rather than citing Bcrman for
what it said 'religious belief' was, Congress cited it for what 'religious belief'
was not." s This line of reasoning on the part of Justice Clark is doubtful at
best, and seems to be an expedient manner in which to dispose of a thorny
problem of legislative intent. 49
Under the view of the Seeger test, the only statutorily excluded claims are
those based upon (1) scruples which are essentially political, sociological or
philosophical and are accompanied by a disavowal of religious belief as it is
here defined by the Court,5 0 and (2) a personal moral code which is the only
basis for objection and has no relation whatsoever to a Supreme Being.5'
The dubiety of the new test is not centered in the Court's positing of those
who are explicitly excluded from exemption, but rather in the Court's acceptance
of a novel, libertarian view of what constitutes religion. Thus, it now appears
that any objection will earn for its proponent an exemption so long as it is neither insincere nor accompanied by a blatant disavowal of all "current" beliefs.02
43. 330 U.S. at 1SS (concurring opinion).
44. United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963); United States
v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407-0 (1909).
43. See Carnahan, Freedom of Conscience and Compulsory Mlilitary Service, 13 Buffalo
L. Rev. 463, 472-75 (1964); Donnid, Governmental Encouragement of Religious Ideology:
A Study of the Current Conscientious Objector Exemption From Military Service, 13 J. Pub.
L. 16 (1964).
46. 3S0 U.S. at 173-74.
47. S.Rep. No. 126S, S0th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (194S).
48. 380 U.S. at 17S.
49. Id. at 177-S0. Justice Clark's argument that the 1948 act v.as intended as a "substantial re-enactment" of the 1940 act does not preclude, as he apparently claims, the adoption of the Berman test by Congress.
50. Id. at 173.
51. Id. at 1S6.
52. The nature of the extension of the test achieved in the instant case is indicated by
its interpretation in Fleming v. United States, 344 F.2d 912, 915-16 (10th Cir. 1965), where
it was stated that Seeger "clearly lays down the rule that before a conscientious objector
classification may be denied on the ground that the applicant's beliefs are based upon
'political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely peronal moral code', thosa factors
must be the sole basis of his claim for the classification."
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The test has apparently become one only of sincerity, 3 and the only claimant who might fail to fit within the new test for exemption would be the
atheistic iconoclast whose objections are purely political, sociological or philosophical, and are insincere.

Constitutional Law-Judge's and Prosecutor's Comments on Defendant's
Failure To Testify Violate the Fifth Amendment.-Petitioner was convicted
of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death. He did not testify at the
trial on the issue of guilt, but he did testify at a separate trial on the issue of
penalty.' The trial court charged the jury that a defendant has a constitutional
right not to testify, but that the jury could take the failure of a defendant to
deny or explain facts against him, which were within his knowledge, as tending
to substantiate the truth of such evidence and as indicating that an unfavorable
inference could reasonably be drawn therefrom.- It added, however, that the same
was not true of evidence about which he had no knowledge. The jury was further
instructed that a defendant's failure to testify about that which he did have
knowledge did not create a presumption of guilt or alone create an inference of
guilt or relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof. 3 The California Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction. 4 The United States Supreme Court held that
comment on failure of the accused to testify violated the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment, which was made applicable to the states by the
fourteenth amendment. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
In Malloy v. Hogan,5 decided last year, the Supreme Court ruled that the fifth
amendment's protection against compulsory self-incrimination was applicable to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.0
53. See Donnici, supra note 45, at 44; Smith & Bell, The Conscientious-Objector
Program-A Search for Sincerity, 19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 695 (1958).
1. Cal. Pen. Code § 190.1 provides for separate trials on the two issues.
2. Cal. Const. art. I, § 13 provides, in part: "No person shall be . . .compelled, in any
criminal case, to be a witness against himself .. .but ... whether the defendant testifies or
not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case
against him may be commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by
the court or the jury." Cal. Pen. Code § 1323 is substantially in accord. See generally 8
Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2250 (history of privilege against self-incrimination), 2272 (inference
and comment) (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Five other states-Ohio, New Jersey, Iowa,
Connecticut and New Mexico-also permit comment on the failure of an accused to testify.
Ralston, Comment and Inference Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 25 Ohio
St. L.J. 578, 581-88 (1964).
3. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 610 (1965).
4. People v. Griffin, 60 Cal. 2d 182, 383 P.2d 432 (1963).
5. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
6. Mr. Justice Brennan, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said that the shift was a
recognition of the fact that the American system of criminal prosecution is "accusatorial, not
inquisitorial," with the fifth amendment's privilege as its essential mainstay; therefore, federal
and state governments are compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently obtained
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Although Malloy set the stage for the present decision, the seed of the issue,
which had remained unsettled for nearly a century, had been planted in the
latter part of the nineteenth century. In 1878, Congress passed an act which
permitted a defendant in a criminal action to testify in his own defense if be so
requested. 7 His failure to so request was not to create any presumption against
him.8 Fifteen years later, in Wilson v. United States,9 the Supreme Court held
that, in a federal proceeding, comment on a defendant's failure to take the stand
was prohibited, and that it was violation of the federal act for the prosecuting
attorney to refer to the failure of the accused to take the stand.
When the same question was first taken to the United States Supreme Court
in reference to a state proceeding, the Court, in Twining v. New Jersey,10
and not by the coerced testimony of the accused. Thus, the fourteenth amendment secures
against state invasion the same privilege that the fifth amendment protects against federal
invasion. Id. at 7-8. The Malloy decision, in effect, overruled earlier cases, such as Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), and Twining v. New Jersey, 211 US. 73 (1903), which held
that the fifth amendment was not applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment
and, thus, it was not obligatory for the Court to rule on whether the right to comment on
the failure of an accused to testify was a violation of the fifth amendment. The Court, in
Adamson v. California, supra at 55, did acknowledge that comment on the failure of an
accused to testify is generally prohibited in American jurisdictions, but it held that the
California law in no way violated the due process clause.
7. Act of March 16, 1S73, ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30 (now IS U.S.C. § 3431 (1964)). "[1n the
trial of all indictments, informations, complaints . . . in the United States courts . . . the
person so charged shall, at his own request but not otherwise, be a competent witnezs. And
his failure to make such request shall not create any presumption against him.' In 1931, the
American Law Institute and the American Bar Association adopted resolutions which stated
that, when a defendant in a criminal trial does not testify, the prosecution and the court
should be permitted to comment upon that fact. 9 ALI Proceedings 202-13 (1931); 56 A.B.A.
Rep. 137-62 (1931). See Bruce, The Right To Comment on the Failure of the Defendant To
Testify, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 226 (1932); Reeder, Comment Upon Failure of Accused To
Testify, 31 'Mich. L. Rev. 40 (1932).
S. Act of March 16, 1373, ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30 (now 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1964)).
9. 149 U.S. 60 (193). In his summation to the jury, the United States Attorney stated:
"'I want to say to you, that if I am ever charged with crime, I will not stop by putting witnesses on the stand to testify to my good character, but I will go upon the stand and hold up
my hand before high Heaven and testify to my innocence of the crime... ." Id. at 66. The
court reasoned that, at common law, one accused of a crime could neither be compelled to
testify against himself, nor was he permitted to testify in his own behalf. Because this rule
often left circumstances which tended to incriminate the accused unexplained, Congress
passed the act of 1S78. However, the Court stated that the act was framed with due regard to
those who might prefer not to take the stand, because "excessive timidity, nervousness when
facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offenses
charged against him, will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase
rather than remove prejudices against him." Ibid. "To prevent such presumption being
created, comment, especially hostile comment, upon such failure must necessarily be excluded
from the jury. The minds of the jurors can only remain unaffected from this circumstance by
excluding all reference to it." Id. at 65. The Wilson decision was followed in Bruno v. United
States, 308 U.S. 297 (1939).
10. 211 U.S. 7S (190S).
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evaded ruling on the issue. The defendant claimed that the state statute permitting comment upon the failure of the accused to testify was a violation of
either the privileges or immunities or the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, and that the state statute violated the privilege against self-incrimination contained within the fifth amendment" which was applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. The Court dismissed this second
argument.' 2 In answering the defendant's first argument, the Court held that
the privilege against self-incrimination was not "one of the fundamental rights
of National citizenship, placed under National protection by the Fourteenth
Amendment ....,13 Furthermore, those fundamental rights which were protected
against national action by the first eight amendments were not included in the
"privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States" and, thus, not
protected against state action by the fourteenth amendment. Nor was the
protection against self-incrimination a part of "due process of law."' 4 Thus,
the Court held that a state could violate the privilege of immunity from selfincrimination without ever deciding whether that privilege had actually been
violated.
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court in the present case, noted that,
in Wilson, the Court rested its decision on an act of Congress and not on the
fifth amendment.' 5 He stated, however, that, if "Fifth Amendment" was substituted for "Act" and for "statute," the spirit of the self-incrimination clause
was reflected.' 6 Comment on the refusal of a defendant to testify was a remnant
of the " 'inquisitorial system of criminal justice' '17 which was outlawed by the
fifth amendment.' 8 The Court thus rebutted the position that in the federal
11. U.S. Const. amend. V. provides, in part: "[NJor shall [any person) be compelled In
liberty, or property,
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
2
without due process of law .
12. 211 U.S. at 97-99.
13. Id. at 93.
14. The Court noted that, when Congress submitted the amendments to the states, It
treated the privilege of self-incrimination and the right of due process as exclusive of each
other. Furthermore, the states themselves, except New Jersey and Iowa, in every case where
the due process clause or its equivalent was included in their individual constitutions, thought
it necessary to separately include the privilege clause. It was an irresistible inference to the
Court that the constitution makers were of the opinion that, if the privilege was fundamental
in any sense, it was not fundamental within the meaning of due process of law, nor an
essential part of it.Id. at 110. In answer to the Court's argument, Mr. Justice Harlan, in his
dissenting opinion, stated that immunity from self-incrimination was protected against state
action not only by the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, but also
by the due process clause. Id. at 117. "The privileges and immunities mentioned in the original
Amendments, and universally regarded as our heritage of liberty from the common law, were
thus secured to every citizen of the United States and placed beyond assault by
any government, Federal or state, and due process of law, in all public proceedings affecting
life, liberty or property, were enjoined equally upon the Nation and the States." Id.at 122.
15. 380 U.S. at 612.
16. Id. at 613-14.
17. Id. at 614, citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
18. Id. at 614. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan argued that comment by
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courts the practice of refraining from comment was based on the construction
of a federal statute and not on a construction of the Constitution. To permit
comment, Mr. Justice Douglas reasoned, would be to impose a penalty for exercising a constitutional privilege and, thus, to make the assertion of that privilege
costly. 19 However, Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting, noted that the Court failed
to specify the penalty that the comment imposed upon the accused. "
In light of the foregoing, it would apear that, if the Court reached its
decision on the theory that the right to comment compelled a defendant to
testify against himself, then its decision was a sound one. It is basic law that
once a defendant takes the stand he waives his privilege against self-incrimination
as to the crime charged and may be compelled to answer as any other witness.21
He will be subject to cross-examination on all matters relevant to the issue, on
his credibility and character, and, under pretense of impeaching him as a witness,
on all incidents of his life.22 It is merely a half-truth to say that there is not
actual compulsion because the accused is free to choose between testifying and
silence. In reality, the right to comment limits the option to either facing the
prosecutor and confessing incriminating facts or remaining silent and letting
the same facts be inferred by the jury and commented upon by the court and
prosecution.3 While the Griffin Court did not expound on this theory, Justice
Stewart, nevertheless, replied to it by stating that the Court "stretches the concept of compulsion beyond all reasonable bounds,"--' and that whatever compulsion does exist arises from the accused's election not to testify and not from any
comment by the court or counsel.25
Some authorities have suggested that a reform in the criminal law in regard
to the cross-examination of the accused is a solution.20 By restricting the areas
into which the prosecutor may probe, it is thought that the defendant need no
longer fear the witness stand. While, idealistically, the suggestion is an effective
one, in reality, cross-examination is a matter of court procedure and, therefore,
prosecutors and judges on a defendant's failure to testify is barred by the fifth amendment,
but he stated that the inevitable decision by the Court, given the decision in Mfaloy, "exemplifies the creeping paralysis with which this Court's recent adoption of the 'incorporation'
doctrine is infecting the operation of the federal system." Id. at 616. In answer to the argument put forth in Malloy that it would be incongruous to have different standards in federal
and state courts, Mr. Justice Harlan stated that incongruity is at the core of the federal system
and that, under the Constitution, the separate governments are not congruent, nor are they
intended to be. Ibid. Thus, be concluded, in attempting to eliminate the friction between
state and federal judicial systems, the Court has not tried to harmonize with the states but
has simply overridden them altogether. Id. at 617.
19. Id. at 614.
20. Id. at 620-21 (dissenting opinion).
21. Richardson, Evidence § 533 (Prince 9th ed. 1964); see People v. Webster, 139 N.Y.
73, 34 N.E. 730 (1893) ; 46 Mlich. L. Rev. 372 (194S).
22. People v. Webster, supra note 21; see Comment, 34 Fordham L. Rev. 107 (1965).
23. See Dunmore, Comment on Failure of Accused To Testify, 26 Yale LJ. 464 (1917).
24. 380 U.S. at 620 (dissenting opinion).
25. Ibid.
26. Bruce, supra note 7, at 232; 46 Mlich. L. Rev. 372, 3S1 (194S).
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its reform could not be enforced upon the individual states. Furthermore, any
reform in the cross-examination procedure which could relieve the accused of
his fear of the witness stand would also, in effect, defeat the purpose of the
27
procedure.
The instant Court dismissed the argument that an unfavorable inference from
the refusal to testify is natural and irresistible, 28 by stating that there was a
difference between what the jury may infer, given no help from the court, and
what they may infer when the court formalizes the silence of the accused into
evidence.2 9
The question arises as to whether the Court implied that the jury could draw
an unfavorable inference on its own.3° It would appear that such an inference
may be unfounded in many instances. As stated by the Court in Wilson v.
United States:31
It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely innocent of the charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and
attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offences charged
against him, will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase
rather than remove prejudices against him. It is not every
one, however honest, who
2would, therefore, willingly be placed on the witness stand.
However, even assuming that an unfavorable inference is prohibited, it is
doubtful whether the Court could effectively instruct the jury to disregard the
inference. In accordance with this position, it has been stated that "it is well
enough to contrive artificial fictions for use by lawyers, but to attempt to enlist
the layman in process of nullifying his own reasoning powers is merely futile and
tends toward confusion and a disrespect for the law's reasonableness."'
27. The purposes of cross-examination are to induce the witness to alter his testimony
and to impeach the witness. Richardson, Evidence §§ 502-03 (Prince 9th ed. 1964). It Is
contended that such a reform would greatly deter the impeachment function.
28. 380 U.S. at 614-15. See Bruce, supra note 7, at 231; Clapp, Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 541, 556 (1956).
29. 380 U.S. at 614. Mr. Justice Stewart, in admitting that an inference is inevitable,
expressed the view that comment on the failure to testify provided a means for articulating
and controlling the inferences which would naturally be drawn by the jury from the
defendant's failure to take the stand. Thus, it would be more advantageous to defendant to
permit comment than to leave the jury to be guided by their "untutored instincts." Id. at 621.
In Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 293 (1939), the Court noted that, "by legislating
against the creation of any 'presumption' from a failure to testify, Congress could not have
meant to legislate against the psychological operation of the jury's mind. It laid down canons
of judicial administration for the trial judge to the extent that his instructions to the jury,
certainly when appropriately invoked, might affect the behavior of jurors."
30. In New York, not only is the prosecutor prohibited from even alluding to the fact
that the accused has failed to testify, but the court may charge the jurors that they are required to follow the dictates of the New York statute, which states that a defendant's failure
to testify does not create a presumption against him. Coleman v. Denno, 223 F. Supp. 938
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 330 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1964); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 393.
31. 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
32. Id. at 66, quoted with approval in 380 U.S. at 613. See note 9 supra.
33. 8 Wigmore,Evidence § 2272, at 436 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
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Constitutional Law-Parolee's Right to Fourth Amendment Protection
Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure.-Defendant was arrested pursuant to an administrative warrant for violation of parole. The parole officer
and two police officers conducted a two-and-one-half hour search of the defendant's apartment immediately following his arrest therein. As a result of the
search, the officers found and seized narcotics hidden in defendant's bedroom.
The defendant was indicted for felonious possession of narcotics. The pretrial
motion to suppress the evidence was denied;' the appellate division affirmed
defendant's conviction. 2 The court of appeals held that the defendant's constitutional rights had not been violated by the search and seizure. People v.
Randazzo, 15 N.Y.2d 526, 202 N.E.2d 549, 254 X.Y.S.2d 99 (1964) (memorandum decision).
Though the defendant had contended that the search and seizure were unlawful since the "warrant merely authorized his arrest for associating with
known criminals-that once he was apprehended the arresting officer had no
right to make a search for contraband, ' 3 the trial court reasoned that "the
entry into the defendant's apartment was with his consent and the search therein
was incident to his lawful arrest for parole violation." 4 The court stated that
apparently the parole officer's procurement of the warrant for defendant's arrest
was in response to information that defendant was associating with a convicted
felon and was dealing in narcotics.5 However, the court failed to explain whether
the erroneous portion of the defendant's contention was that the warrant
authorized only an arrest for consorting tith a known criminal, or that once
the defendant was arrested the officer had no right to look for contraband. In
other words, did the court find that the basis for the issuance of the warrant
was suspicion of dealing in narcotics and, hence, that a search for narcotics
was incident to the arrest? Or did the court find that, because of the defendant's
status as a parolee, the subsequent search for contraband was incident to an
1. People v. Randazzo, 37 Misc. 2d SO, 234 N.YS.2d 740 kSup. CL 1962).
2. People v. Randazzo, 20 App. Div. 2d 850, 243 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1st Dep't 1964)
(memorandum decision).

3. 37 Misc. 2d at S1, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 742. The court of appeals' lone disspnter, Judge
Fuld, agreed with defendant's contention: "[T]he Parole Officer was unquestionably empowered to arrest the defendant for a parole violation ... but I doubt that the consequent
2y 2 -hour search of his apartment can be considered 'incident' to an arrest based on a charge
of consorting with a known criminal." 15 N.Y.2d at 528, 202 N.E.2d at 530, 254 N.YS2d
at 101. Chief Judge Desmond, however, concurred strictly on the basis that the search vms
incidental to the arrest. Id. at 527, 202 N.E.2d at 550, 254 N.YS.2d at ICO.
4. 37 'Misc. 2d at S1, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
5. "It appeared that the parole officer had received information that Randazzo had consorted with a convicted felon, a narcotics violator, that Randazzo was suspected of being
involved in the narcotics traffic .... Based on this information, the parole officer obtained
a parole warrant for Randazzo's arrest." Id. at Si, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
Under the New York Correction Law, both knowledge of a parolee's violation of a con-

dition of parole, i.e., association with a known criminal, and reasonable cause to believe he
has lapsed into criminal behavior are independent grounds for issuance of a warrant for
retaking a paroled prisoner. N.Y. Correc. Law § 216.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 34

arrest for parole violation regardless of the basis for the issuance of the warrant?
The brevity of the opinion and the ambiguity in the language preclude a
conclusive determination as to what the trial court actually found.0 Since a
search for contraband would be incident to an arrest for breaching parole by
dealing in narcotics, the only question which would arise is whether the search
was too long or exploratory. 7 However, if the sole basis for the issuance of the
warrant was defendant's association with a known criminal, the search of the
defendant's apartment would appear not to have been incident to the arrest8
and would, therefore, have been unreasonable. The resultant evidence would
be inadmissible against the defendant unless the defendant first consented to
the search.
In discussing the consent issue, the trial court stated that the defendant had
signed a certificate of release on parole stipulating that he would permit his
parole officer to visit his home and make "a search of his person or of his
home." 9 The stipulation in the certificate of release to which the court referred
read as follows: "I will carry out the instructions of my parole officer, report
as directed and permit him to visit me at my residence and place of employment."' 0 Since the stipulation does not mention the word "search," the trial
judge either misread the certificate of release or interpreted the language as
tantamount to consent. Such an interpretation is certainly at odds with the
rule that such consent, or waiver of one's constitutional protection against Unreasonable search and seizure, must be specific and unequivocal."
The court of appeals affirmed in a single sentence opinion: "Defendant6. That the court based its holding on the parolee's status may be implied from the following dictum: "No New York case has been referred to relating to the rights of a parolee
to claim that upon his arrest for a parole violation that a search of his person or his home
would constitute an unlawful search and a seizure of contraband made contemporaneously
would violate his constitutional rights. It would seem that parolee's rights to claim that an
unlawful search and seizure occurred, because of their particular status, are rnore circumscribed and limited than the rights of citizens not in such status. By accepting the privilege
of parole, a prisoner consents to the broad supervisory and visitorial powers which his
parole officer must exercise over his person and property until the time his sentence shall
have expired or been terminated." 37 Misc. 2d at 82, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 742-43.
7. It is undisputed that a search may be made without a search warrant if incident to a
lawful arrest. E.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 (1947). However, a general exploratory search for evidence of a crime is prohibited. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) ; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
8. For a search to be incident to an arrest, the objects sought must be properly subject
to seizure. See Harris v. United States, supra note 7, at 154. Such objects are: fruits of tile
crime; means by which the crime was committed; or weapons by which an escape could be
effected. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
9. 37 Misc. 2d at 81, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
10. Certificate of Release on Parole, New York State Division of Parole.
11. Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Karwickl v. United
States, 55 F.2d 225, 226 (4th Cir. 1932) (per curiam) ; In the Matter of Remy Sportswear,
Inc., 16 Misc. 2d 407, 411, 183 N.Y.S.2d 125, 130 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1959).
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appellant, as a parolee, was deprived of no constitutional rights by the search
and seizure which was made under the circumstances of this case (People ex rel.
Natoli v. Lewis ... Anderson v. Corall ...."12 The use of the phrase "as a
parolee" and the citation of two cases dealing with the rights and status of
parolees appear to imply that the defendant's status "as a parolee" was a controlling factor in the case. Judge Fuld, in his dissent, reasoned that, if the
search was not incident to the arrest, the holding constituted a complete and
unjustified denial of all fourth amendment protection to parolees. 3 There is
no authority for such an absolute denial of fourth amendment rights. There
seems to be, however, a satisfactory rationale for a limitation of such rights.
In Anderson v. Corall,14 the Supreme Court decided that a parolee who violates
his parole conditions is on the same footing as an escaped convict and is,
therefore, not entitled to a reduction in his sentence for that period of time
after the parole infraction.15 The Court, however, incidentally stated that,
since the parolee remains subject to the warden's control and is in his legal
custody, he is, in legal effect, imprisoned. 1
While in the actual custody of the law, a convict obviously has no right to
free association and travel, nor is he entitled to protection against search and
seizure.17 Since a parolee has no right to parole,le it follows that the State may
restore only part of a convict's rights while withholding others. In Hyser v.
12. 15 N.Y.2d at 527, 202 N.E2d at 550, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
13. "I cannot believe that one's status as a parolee deprives him of all right to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. The beneficent purposes sought to be served by parole
would, to a large extent, be destroyed if a parolee's home could be searched at any time,
without probable or reasonable grounds ...." Id. at 52S, 202 N.E.2d at 550, 254 N.Y.S.2d at
100 (dissenting opinion).
14. 263 U.S. 193 (1923).
15. Id. at 196-97.
16. Id. at 196. In People ex rel. Natoli v. Lewis, which the Randazzo majority cited, the
New York Court of Appeals stated that, according to § 213 of the New York Correction

Law, the parolee was in the warden's legal custody, and although "he was not always
within the institution walls . . . . [Hle was always in constructive custody subject to he
retaken and returned to actual custody." 287 N.Y. 47S, 432, 41 N.E.2d 62, 64 (1942).
17. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962); cf. Brown v. McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531,
ISO N.E.2d 791, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962), wherein the court stated: "While this section
[N.Y. Correc. Law § 610] confers upon prison inmates the right to religious services,
spiritual advice and ministration from some recognized clergyman, it also euprezly authorizes the reasonable curtailment of such rights if such is necessary for the 'prop2r
discipline and management of the institution'" Id. at 535-36, 10 N.E.2d at 793, 225
N.Y.S.2d at 500.
13. "Parole is not a right, but a privilege, to be granted or withheld as discretion [of the
Parole Board] may impel." People ex rel. Cecere v. Jennings, 250 X.Y. 239, 241, 165 N.E.
277, 273 (1928). A possible problem with equal protection of the lax has been rendcred
moot by Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 203 US. 481, 437-S9 (190S), wherein the Court stated:
"As the State is thus providing for the granting of a favor [parole] to a convicted criminal
confined within one of its prisons... it may in its discretion exclude such classes of persons
[twice convicted felons] from participating in the favor as may to it seem fit." A more
recent case directly on point is State v. Thomas, 224 La. 431, 69 So. 2d 738 (1953).
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Reed,'9 a federal court of appeals stated: "The United States cannot constitutionally impair a citizen's right to leave the District of Columbia or
frequent pool halls, but it can do so to [parolees] ... whose freedoms have been
substantially abridged in accord with the requirements of due process."2 0 The
Supreme Court has also considered the restrictions placed upon a parolee. In
Jones v. Cunningham,2' the Court held that the restraints upon a parolee's
liberty were sufficient to invoke the writ of habeas corpus. 2 2 The Court specifically referred to the parolee's inability to associate with known criminals and
his confinement to a particular community. 23 It would appear that the Court
impliedly assumed the validity of these restrictions. The Court, however, did
not mention limitations on a parolee's fourth amendment protection. This was
probably due to the fact that such protection is not ordinarily specifically
restricted by the parole agreement.2 4 If the Court does come to consider this
issue, it is quite possible that it would uphold restrictions on fourth amendment rights as it apparently has on first and fifth amendment rights.
The
Court could, however, distinguish these restrictions on the ground that a
deprivation of fourth amendment protection could result in conviction of another
crime, whereas limitations on the constitutional rights of association and travel
could not.
Although none of the cases mentioned is entirely on point, it is possible to
extract from them a general approbation of a partial limitation on parolees'
protection against search and seizure. 26 It would seem, in fact, that Judge
19. 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
20. Id. at 239 (dictum).
21. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
22. Id. at 243.
23. "Petitioner is confined by the parole order to a particular community, house, and
job at the sufferance of his parole officer. He cannot drive a car without permission. He
must periodically report to his parole officer, permit the officer to visit his home and Job
at any time, and follow the officer's advice. He is admonished to keep good company and
good hours, work regularly, [and] keep away from undesirable places . . . ." Id. at 242.
24. N.Y. Correc. Law § 215 provides: "The board of parole in releasing a prisoner on
parole shall specify in writing the conditions of his parole . . . . The board shall adopt general rules with regard to conditions of parole and their violation and may make special rules
to govern particular cases. Such rules, both general and special, may include, among other
things, a requirement that the parolee shall not leave the state without the consent of the
board . . . that he shall contribute to the support of his dependents, that he shall make
restitution for his crime . . . that he shall abandon evil associates and ways, that he shall
carry out the instructions of his parole officer and in general so comport himself as such
officers shall determine."
25. The right to associate freely with others, protected by the first amendment, and the
right to travel, protected by the fifth amendment, were circumscribed in Jones v. Cunningham. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
26. It is to be noted that, in Jones v. Cunningham, neither the right to freedom of association nor the right to travel was totally denied to the parolee, but rather was subjected
to what the Court considered a reasonable limitation. It is possible that the same rationale
will be applied to search and seizure.
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Fuld would not take issue with such a conclusion$ 7 He expressed fear, however, that the majority actually was holding that a parolee has no fourth amendment rights. Such a decision would not be based on any existing precedent,
though the reason for the decision would be readily apparent. Undeniably,
many paroled convicts return immediately to criminal activities. Realizing this,
the authorities are loath to relax their previously unbridled discretion to search
and seize. It is possible that the instant court was in accord and so held. It is
indeed unfortunate, however, that the court, in dealing with a matter so fraught
with consequences, should have couched its opinion in ambiguous language,
for it is unclear whether this was, in fact, the holding of the case.

Constitutional Law-State Department Regulation Restricting Travel
to Cuba Held Constitutional.-Appellant, in 1962, applied to the State Department to have his passport validated for travel to Cuba as a tourist. The
application was denied on the ground that the purpose of the trip was not
within the standards previously established for such travel.' Appellant sought
declaratory and injunctive relief in the federal district court for the District
of Connecticut, and, in a divided opinion, a three judge court granted summary
judgment for the Secretary of State on the ground that the Secretary had
valid and constitutional statutory authority to impose area restrictions on
travel 2 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court, three justices dissenting, affirmed
the district court's ruling, holding that the Secretary of State had congressional
authority under the Passport Act of 19263 to impose area restrictions on travel,
and that the restriction on travel to Cuba did not violate appellant's constitutional rights. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
The Passport Act of 1926 authorizes the Secretary of State to grant and issue
passports "under such rules as the President shall designate .... 14 In 1952, a
27. Judge Fuld's denouncing of a deprivation of "all right" to fourth amendment protection and a search of a parolee's home "at any time, without probable or reaonablb
grounds" could be a basis for inferring that a curtailment, as opposed to a total deprivation, would be permissible. 15 N.Y.2d at 527, 202 N.E.2d at 550, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 10 (dissenting opinion).
1. In January 1961, the State Department issued State Dep't Reg. 103.456, 22 C.F.R.
§ 53.3(b) (1965), amending 22 C.F.R. § 53.3(b) (195S), which made it nece-sary for a

United States citizen to have a valid passport in order to travel to Cuba. Simultancuosly,
Public Notice 179, 26 Fed. Reg. 492 (1961), and Department of State Press Release, No. 24,
Jan. 16, 1961, were issued by the State Department; the former declaring all outstanding
passports invalid for travel to Cuba because unrestricted travel would be contrary to
United States foreign policy and not in the national interest, and the latter stating that
exceptions on the travel ban to Cuba would be made when it was considered in the besqt
interest of the United States.
2. Zemel v. Rusk, 228 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1964).
3. 44 Stat. 657, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1964).
4. Ibid. The Passport Act of 1926 is a substantial re-enactment of the Act of August 1:,
1356, ch. 127, § 23, 11 Stat. 60, which was the first statute enacted by Congress regulating
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State Department regulation was issued prohibiting the issuance of passports to
members of the Communist Party, to persons who actively support the Communist movement, and to persons going abroad to advance the Communist cause.5
Two applicants who were denied passports under this regulation sought relief
in the federal courts.0 In Kent v. Dulles,7 the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four
decision, held that the Passport Act of 1926 and section 215 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 18528 "do not delegate to the Secretary the kind of
authority exercised here." 9 The majority, in construing these statutes, found no
evidence in their legislative history or in the administrative practice of granting
passports prior to the 1926 act to support a holding that Congress intended to
authorize the Secretary of State to refuse passports to citizens because of their
beliefs or associations.' ° The Court found that, at the time the 1926 act was
adopted, "the administrative practice, so far as relevant here, had jelled only
around the two categories . . .""-refusals of passports based on non-allegiance,
and unlawful conduct. 1 2 Although the Court declared that the right to travel is
a liberty protected by the fifth amendment, 13 it did not decide to what extent
this liberty could be constitutionally curtailed. 1 '
After the Kent decision, the State Department revised its 1952 regulation, 15
basing the revision on sections 6 and 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act
the issuance of passports. Prior to 1856, passports were issued by various federal, state and
local officials. The 1856 act made it unlawful for one not under the authority of the
Secretary of State to issue passports; and today, only the State Department has authority
to grant and issue passports.
5. State Dep't Reg. 108.162, 17 Fed. Reg. 8013 (1952).
6. Dr. Walter BriehI, a psychiatrist, and Rockwell Kent, an artist, were denied passports
for travel to Europe on the ground that they were Communists. After being denied relief
at separate State Department hearings, both parties sued in the district court for the
District of Columbia for declaratory relief. The district court, in unreported decisions,
granted summary judgment for the Secretary of State in both cases. On appeal, the court
of appeals, in affirming the district court decisions, held that the State Department had
congressional authority to deny passports to Communists. Briehil v. Dulles, 248 F.2d
561 (D.C. 1957); Kent v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
7. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
8. 66 Stat. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1964). This section made it unlawful to enter or
leave the United States without a valid passport after the issuance of a presidential
proclamation of war or national emergency. A proclamation by President Truman in 1953
made this section effective, and, as the proclamation is still outstanding, this restriction on
travel is currently in force. Proc. No. 3004, 18 Fed. Reg. 489 (1953).
9. 357 U.S. at 129.
10. Id. at 129-30.
11. Id. at 128.
12. Ibid.
13. Id. at 127, 129.
14. Id. at 129-30.
15. State Dep't Reg. 108.475, 22 C.F.R. § 51.135 (1965). This regulation provides: "A
passport shall not be issued to, or renewed for, any individual who the issuing officer knows
or has reason to believe is a member of a Communist organization registered or required
to be registered under § 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 as amended."
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of 1950.16 Section 7 of this Act requires all Communist organizations to register
with the Attorney General, including any organization required to register by a

final order of the Subversive Activities Control Board. Section 6 made it unlawful for a member of a registered organization or one under a final order of
the Board to apply for or use a passport. Section 7 was held to be constitutional
when, in 1961, the United States Supreme Court upheld a 1953 order of the
17
Board requiring the registration of the Communist Party of the United States.
Subsequently, the passports of Herbert Aptheker and Elizabeth Flynn, high

ranking members of the Communist Party,' 8 were revoked pursuant to section 6,0
and the parties sought relief in the district court for the District of Columbia.2

In Aptheker v. Secretary of State,23 the Supreme Court, six-to-three, applying

a test 2l previously reserved for restrictions dealing with first amendment freedoms, 2 2 held section 6 to be unconstitutional on its face, stating that "the
section, judged by its plain import and by the substantive evil which Congress

sought to control, sweeps too widely and too indiscriminately across the liberty

guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment. '2 3 Mr. Justice Goldberg, writing for the
majority, found that the section indiscriminately excluded from consideration the
individual's actual knowledge of the registration or registration order,21 his

activity in and commitment to the Communist organization,23 his purpose in
traveling, 26 and his destination.2 7 As a result of the Supreme Court's rulings in
Kent and Aptheker, the State Department currently does not have the power
to curtail the travel of an individual because he is a Communist or Communist
supporter.
16. 64 Stat. 993, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1964) ; 64 Stat. 995, 50 US.C. § 7M6 (1964).
17. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Ed., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
18. Aptheker was the editor of Political Affairs, a major Communist periodical publishcd
in the United States, and Flynn was the chairman of the party.
19. Flynn v. Rusk, 219 F. Supp. 709 (D.D.C. 1963). The district court, relying on
congressional findings as to the nature of the World Communist Movement, held § 6
constitutional, finding the restriction on the issuance of passports a reasonable regulation of
the evil sought to be controlled. Summary judgment was granted to the Secretary of State,
and the parties appealed directly to the Supreme Court under 2S U.S.C. § 1253 (1964).
20.

378 U.S. 500 (1964).

21. The majority stated that, "although previous cases have not involved the constitutionality of statutory restrictions upon the right to travel abroad, there are well-established
principles by which to test whether the restrictions here imposed are consistent vith the
liberty guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment. It is a familiar and basic principle, recently
reaffirmed in NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, that 'a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.'" 373 U.S. at 507-03. (Italics omitted.)
22. The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 196-97 (1964).
23. 373 U.S. at 514.
24. Id. at 509-10.
25. Id. at 510-11.
26. Id. at 511.
27. Id. at 512.
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Appellant, in the instant case, challenged the State Department's refusal to
validate his passport for travel to Cuba on two theories: first, that the Secretary
of State lacked authority to impose a restriction on travel to Cuba; and, second,
that this restriction constituted a violation
of his constitutional rights as guaran28
teed by the first and fifth amendments.
As to the first ground, the Court held that the Passport Act of 1926 granted to
the Secretary of State authority to restrict travel to Cuba. In construing this
statute, the majority found that its legislative history indicated an intent
neither to authorize area restrictions nor to preclude such authority. However,
it considered the use by Congress of language broad enough to authorize area
restrictions, after the State Department had imposed area restrictions on travel
under predecessor statutes, 30 to support a conclusion that Congress intended to
grant 'this power under the 1926 act. Also, it found that the continued imposition
of area restrictions by the Secretary of State in implementing the 1926 act,91
coupled with the enactment of section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952,32 which dealt with passports and which left untouched the broad
authority granted in the 1926 act, was evidence reinforcing this conclusion.
Kent was distinguished on the basis that the history of the Passport Act was
considered only "so far as material to passport refusals based on the character of
the particular applicant," 34 whereas the instant situation was concerned with a
passport refusal based on "foreign policy considerations affecting all citizens." '
Mr. Justice Goldberg, dissenting, examined the legislative history of the 1926
act and the administrative practice before and after the act, and concluded that
the only intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to centralize in the
State Department the authority to issue passports.30 Prior to the enactment of
the Passport Act, restrictions were imposed on travel to Belgium in 1915 because
of the famine in that country, and, from 1914 to 1918, travel was permitted only
to specified countries and for specified purposes due to World War I. After the
war, passports were not validated for travel to Austria and Germany until July
28.

381 U.S. at 4.

29.

Id. at 7-8.

30. Acting pursuant to the Act of 1856, ch. 127, § 23, 11 Stat. 60, the State Department, in 1915, stopped issuing passports for travel to Belgium, except for emergency purposes,
because of the famine in that country, and, during World War I, passports were validated
only for specific purposes and for specific countries. 381 U.S. at 8-9.
31. After 1926, restrictions were imposed on travel to the following countries: Ethiopia,
in 1935; Spain, in 1936; China, in 1937; Yugoslavia, in 1947; Hungary, from 1949 to 1951;
Czechoslovakia, in 1951; Albania, Bulgaria, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, Roumania and the Soviet Union, in 1952; in 1955, the travel ban on Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Roumania and the Soviet Union was removed, but North Korea
and North Viet Nam were added to the list; and Hungary was added again in 1956. Id. at
9-11.
32. 66 Stat. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1964).
33. 381 U.S. at 9-12.
34. Id. at 13
35. Id. at 13. (Emphasis added.)
36. Id. at 31-40 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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1922, and none were issued for travel to Russia until September 1923. Mr.
Justice Goldberg dismissed these restrictions from consideration as wartime
regulations.37 However, it would appear that the danger to the United States
and its citizens in these instances was similar to that which the State Department sought to avoid in restricting travel to Cuba. As to the area restrictions
imposed after 1926, Mr. justice Goldberg did not view them as a "consistent
administrative interpretation of the 1926 Act" 3 to be given weight in construing the statute. Criticizing the majority's distinguishing of Kent, he considered that case controlling since, in his opinion, that decision was based on a
finding that the Secretary of State had no authority to impose travel restrictions
of any kind in peacetime.3 9 It is submitted that these post-1926 restrictions on
travel do indicate a consistent administrative interpretation of the 1926 act by
the State Department, and that the majority was correct in declaring the preand post-1926 travel restrictions to be evidence of a congressional intent to
authorize the Executive to impose area restrictions on travel. The Kent
holding is not controlling in the instant situation, for, as the majority pointed
out, that decision was concerned with unlimited travel restrictions based on the
individual himself, rather than on the travel destination 10
Having determined that the Secretary of State had authority to impose area
restrictions on travel, the instant Court then held that the use of this authority
to restrict travel to Cuba did not violate appellant's constitutional rights.
After reaffirming the Kent finding that "'the right to travel is a part of the
"liberty" of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law
the majority stated that this fifth amendment
under the Fifth Amendment.' ,41
liberty could be curtailed under certain circumstances, and that the requirement
of due process is relative to the extent of, and the necessity for, the restriction
imposed. Writing for the majority, Mr. Chief justice Warren reasoned that,
due to the danger of Communist subversion, and particularly in view of the
President's statutory duty to use any means short of war to free a United
States citizen unjustly detained by a foreign government, "the Secretary has
justifiably concluded that travel to Cuba by American citizens might involve the
Nation in dangerous international incidents, and that the Constitution does not
require him to validate passports for such travel."42 The Court ignored the test
used in Aptheker that the restrictive regulation must be "'narrowly drawn to
applying, instead, a test whereby the reasonableprevent the supposed evil,' ,,43
ness and necessity of the regulation are considered in relation to the evil it seeks
to control. The principle applied in Aptheker seemed to be based on a consideration that the right to travel is a freedom closely related to the first amendment
37.
3S.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 37 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 35 n.7 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 37-39 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14, quoting from Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (193S).
Id. at 15.
378 U.S. at 514, quoting from Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
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liberties of free speech and association. The Zemel majority, by ignoring the
test used in Aptheker, would appear to have rejected this contention.
This apparent rejection of Aptheker seems to be supported by the Court's
refusal to accept appellant's assertion that the ban on travel to Cuba violated
his first amendment right to travel abroad to learn firsthand of "the effects
abroad of our Government's policies," 44 and of conditions in other countries
"which might affect such policies. '45 The majority, finding the travel ban a restriction on action rather than on the right to free speech and press, stated that
"the right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to
gather information. '46 Mr. Justice Douglas, also dissenting, declared the right to
travel to be "peripheral" to the enjoyment of the first amendment guarantees
of free speech and free press, as travel is necessary to acquire the knowledge
which gives meaning and substance to these liberties. 47 He agreed that Congress
has the power to restrict or ban travel to certain areas when the danger involved
demands it.48 In the instant situation, however, since there was no congressional
determination that travel to Cuba was dangerous to our national security, he
considered the restriction on travel to that country to be based on an arbitrary
decision by the Secretary of State. In his view, the Communist regime in Cuba
did not present a danger
to our national interest which justified a restriction on
49
the right to travel.
The majority, considering the Communist regime in Cuba to present a danger
to be avoided,50 concluded that the Secretary of State was justified in restricting the right to travel in order to prevent the threat to our national security. 1
The finding of a danger was based on -the acts of the Cuban Government in
attempting to spread Communist subversion throughout the hemisphere and in
arresting United States citizens without cause.52 It seems clear that the
majority was justified in its conclusion. The area restriction would appear
to be an effective way to meet the Cuban threat without undue regulation of
the constitutional right to travel.

Labor Law-Federal Pre-emption-New York's Railroad Full Crew Laws
Held To Be Constitutional and Not Superseded by Binding Arbitration
Award Made Pursuant to Federal Statute.-Ten railroad companies, engaged
in interstate commerce in New York, questioned the constitutional validity of
the "railroad full crew laws" as provided for in sections 54(a), (b) and (c) of
44.
45.
46.
47.

381 U.s. at 16.
Ibid.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 25 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

48.

Ibid.

49. Ibid.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 15.
Ibid.
Id. at 14-15.
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the New York Railroad Law.' Petitioners asserted that the effect of these
sections is to compel them to employ unnecessary train crew members, which
constitutes a confiscation of their property 2 without due process of law; that
sections 54(a) and (c), which apply only to railroads of more than fifty miles
in length, deny to petitioners equal protection of the laws; that sections 54(a)
and (c) interfere with interstate commerce; 3 and that, due to the congressional
enactment of Public Law SS-10, 4 the sections, insofar as they differ from the
provisions of the federal statute, have been superseded by it and, therefore,
are unconstitutional.' The court, in dismissing the complaint, denied relief on
all charges and upheld the constitutionality of the full crew laws. New Yorh
Cent. R.R. v. Lefkowitz, 259 N.Y.S.2d 76 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
1. N.Y. R.R. Law §§ 54(a)-(c). In essence, the full crew laws are safety measures which
require that a train be manned by a crew of a specified number depending on the typa of
engine used for propulsion, the car length of the train, the track distance of the railroad,
and the type of transportation and activity in which the train is engaged.
2. Petitioners claimed that the cost of employing additional members for the crew in
order to conform with the railroad full crew laws averages annually to $13,444,694, which
is approximately $1,350,C00 per railroad. They further asserted that the sections in question
have no reasonable relationship to the safety of the public, and, therefore, that the result
is to impose on them a financial burden of employing unnecessary firemen (annually costing
$3,746,S66.24), brakemen ($2,921,054.2S), trainmen ($1,904,031.',M) and baggagemen
($272,741.68), which constitutes a confiscation of their property without due process
of law.
3. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 provides, in part: "The Congress shall have Power
to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . ." The
rationale behind petitioner's assertion is that the full crew laws discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of local or intrastate commerce since §§ 54(a) and 54(c) apply
only to railroads of more than fifty miles, while railroads of less than fifty miles in length
are exempt. Plaintiffs, therefore, maintain that the intrastate railroads which have shorter
railroad lines are benefited while interstate railroads are burdened.
4. 77 Stat. 132 (1963), 45 U.S.C. § 157 (1964). This federal legislation vas enacted
in August of 1963 in order to avoid a threatened national railvay strike. Section 2 of the
act provided for the creation of an arbitration board which was directed to rezolve the
train crew issues which were raised by the railroads. The arbitration board, pursuant to
Public Law SS-10, issued its award in November 1963. The award greatly reduced the
number of firemen positions previously required on the railroads by the full crew laws.
The award was predicated on the board's finding that the crew positions could be abolished
without endangering the safe operation of freight and yard diesel locomotives. In regard
to the other crew positions, including baggagemen, brakemen and trainmen, the board
found that there was some overmanning, but felt that the crews necessary to insure safety
should be determined on a local basis by special boards of adjustment. These special boards
have convened and, pursuant to the award, have approved changes which allow the
operation of trains with crews consisting of fewer trainmen than were required under the
full crew laws. 259 N.Y.S.2d at 3-S9.
5. U.S. Const. art. VI, c. 2 provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
6. 259 N.Y.S.2d at 53-S4.
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The New York controversy concerning full crew laws originated in 1907. 7
In 1911, the United States Supreme Court seemed to settle the constitutional
question by holding that an Arkansas full crew statute was constitutional. 8 In
light of this decision, New York enacted section 54(a) in 1913, section 54(b)
in 1936, and section 54(c) in 1937, as safety measures requiring trains to be
manned by crews of specified numbers.9 The intention of the legislature was
that the greatest care should be taken to protect human life and safety, despite
the additional expense incurred by the railroads in maintaining larger crews. 10
Since the time of their passage and, particularly, in the last five years, legislation to repeal the full crew laws has been introduced into the New York Legislature," but such legislation has not yet been adopted.
In 1963, Congress passed Public Law 88-108,12 which established, for the
purpose of collective bargaining between the railroad and its employees, an
arbitration board empowered to make a binding award with respect to the
number of crew members required on various types of trains. 13 The resulting
award lessened, in some cases, the number of crew members previously required
by the full crew laws. 14 Thus, new fuel was added to the constitutional logomachy, which has been intensified as a result of a recent federal court decision
which held that Public Law 88-108 superseded state full crew laws. 15 The
7. The first full crew law was introduced and passed by the New York Legislature In
1907, but it was later vetoed by Governor Hughes on the grounds that it violated tile
equal protection and due process clauses. Id. at 84.
8. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911). The Arkansas statute
was attacked again in 1916 and 1931, but the Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality,
stating that the state may pass laws as police regulations and may specify requirements
to be observed by the railroads for the safety of its employees and the public. Missouri Pac.
R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249, modified per curiam, 283 U.S. 809 (1931); St. Louis, I. Mt. &
So. Ry. v. Arkansas, 240 U.S. 518 (1916).
9. See note 1 supra.
10. 259 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
11. See, e.g., Sen. Introd. No. 2517, N.Y. State Leg. 188th Sess. (1965).
12. 77 Stat. 132 (1963), 45 U.S.C. § 157 (1964). See note 4 supra.
13. 259 N.Y.S.2d at 110-11. Collective bargaining agreements made pursuant to federal
legislation become the law of the land. Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358
U.S. 283 (1959); Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); Hill v.
Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). "Since the arbitration was conducted under
the aegis of Congress, the award becomes part of the law of the land." In re Certain
Carriers, 229 F. Supp. 259, 260 (D.D.C. 1964). In this case, an action was bought by
railroad petitioners for an injunction to implement an award made by a special board of
adjustment.
14. See note 4 supra.
15. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Hardin, 239 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Ark. 1965). The court
reasoned that where the enforcement of a state law would substantially interfere with the
administration or policy promulgated under the federal law, the state law is pre-empted.
Id. at 15-17. The court, finding that the practical administration of the state statute conflicted with the award made pursuant to Public Law 88-108, held that the state full crew
laws were therefore superseded. Id. at 27-28.
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decision under consideration has disagreed with the conclusions reached by

that federal court.1'

The instant court, in deciding that the statutes under attack did not violate

due process, operated under the theory that due process of law is satisfied if a
statute is reasonable and calculated to correct some manifest evil or danger.17

In the determination of the reasonableness of the statutes, the court considered the additional cost to the railroads of conforming to the crew require-

ments of the statutes.18 The evidence indicated that the advantage to the
public was far greater than the proportionate expense incurred by the rail-

roads. 19 The court was also of the opinion that the statutes were calculated to
protect the public from a manifest hazard since the evidence showed that the
crew required by the full crew laws could not be lessened without some sacrifice
of safety, and that, although technological advances since the statutes were
enacted have diminished the danger of rail travel, such diminution does not
allow, as far as safety is concerned, a proportional lessening of the train crew
requirements of the disputed statutes.20
The court further found, contrary to petitioner's claim, that the statutes did

not contravene the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
The legislature has a wide margin of discretion in exclusion and inclusion with

regard to classes which must conform to any particular state police law. 2 ' Thus,
even though it may seem discriminatory, at first glance, that railroads of more
than fifty miles have been singled out from other forms of rail transportation
by being required to adhere to standards set by full crew statutes, such statutes
do not deny equal protection of the laws, assuming the classification is reason-

able, since they are applicable to all belonging to the same class.2
16. 259 N.Y.S.2d at 107-15.
17. Id. at 93; accord, United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., .304 U.S. 144, 152 (1933).

IS. See note 2 supra.
19. 259 N.Y.S.2d at 102-03.
20. Id. at 92.
21. Id. at 104; Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-67 (1957). "A classification hating
some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause [equal protection] mcrdy because
it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality:'
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 7S (1911). The instant court recognized
that equal protection of the laws requires that such a classification be reasonable. The
court felt that § 54(c), which applies only to railroads of more than fifty miles, constitutes
a reasonable classification since the sw-itching and road operations on longer runs are more
hazardous than on shorter runs. 259 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
22. St. Louis, I. Mt. & So. Ry. v. Arkansas, 240 U.S. 513, 521 (1916); Chicago, RI. &
Pac. Ry. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453, 465-66 (1911); New York, N.H. & H.R.R.R. v. New
York, 165 U.S. 628, 634 (1897) ; New York Cent. & H.R.R.R. v. Williams, 199 N.Y. 103, 123,
92 N.E. 404, 409 (1910), aff'd sub nom. Erie R.R. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 65 (1914). "'The
statute is uniform in its operation upon all railroad companies doing business in the State
of the class to which it is made applicable.' (Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Arkawsas, supra
at 465, quoting from New York, N.H. & H.R.R.R. v. New York, supra at 634) ... [Thus,]
there is no basis for the contention that there has been a denial of the equal protection
of the laws." Id. at 466.
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The instant court further stated that the full crew laws did not interfere
23
with interstate commerce so as to contravene the United States Constitution.
Full crew laws undeniably have some effect upon interstate commerce, but they
do not substantially burden it to a degree which would impede the flow of
commerce into or out of the state.2 4 The court reasoned that the states are
allowed a wide scope in their exercise of power within the purview of their
jurisdiction even though interstate commerce may be affected, as long as
Congress, which may take entire charge of the field, has not adopted any
national regulatory statute which would conflict with the state statute. 25
Thus, the court was faced with the question of whether Congress has, in
fact, expressly or impliedly superseded state railroad full crew laws by the
enactment of Public Law 88-108 in 1963.26 The court reasoned that the safeguarding of health and safety is a local problem to be regulated by the states
unless the field has been occupied by Congress.2 7 The instant court found that
although Public Law 88-108 pertained to crew standards, it had not superseded
the full crew laws. 28 The court concluded, after analyzing the legislative history
of the federal enactment and award made thereunder,2 9 that Public Law 88-108
was passed in an effort to provide a settlement of an existing labor dispute and
that Congress did not propose to enter the crew requirement field.80 Moreover,
it was doubted that Congress intended that constitutionally provided police
powers of the states were to be superseded by a collective bargaining agreement
between the railroads and their employees. 31 In examining the report of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and the statement of the
neutral members of the arbitration board, the court decided that the language
used in each indicated that the award was not clearly intended to supersede
or modify any state full crew law. 32 Thus, in finding that the legislative purpose
with respect to pre-emption was not apparent, the court reasoned that it was
not bound to hold that the state statutes under attack were superseded.83
23. 259 N.Y.S.2d at 106-07.
24. Id. at 106. "While the full train crew laws undoubtedly placed an added financial
burden on the railroads . . . they did not obstruct interstate transportation or seriously
impede it." Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 782 (1945); Missouri
Pac. R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249, 255, modified per curiam, 283 U.S. 809 (1931); Chicago,
R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453,466 (1911).
25. 259 N.Y.S.2d at 108-09; see Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1, 9
(1937); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249, 252, modified per curiam, 283 U.S.
809 (1931) ; Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453, 466 (1911) ; New York, N.H.
& H.R.R.R. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628, 632 (1897).
26. 259 N.Y.S.2d at 107; see note 4 supra.
27. 259 N.Y.S.2d at 107. "Regulation to insure safety is an exercise of the police power.
It is primarily a state function ...." Bradley v. Public Util. Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92, 95 (1933).
28. 259 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
29. Id. at 107-14.
30. Id. at 110-11.
31. Id. at 111.
32.

Id.

33.

Id. at 114.

at 112-13.
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In analyzing the instant court's reasoning on the preemption issue, two
notable shortcomings are evident. Though conceding that some of the language
used in the award clearly and expressly authorized what the state statutes
interdict,-34 the court, nevertheless, reasoned that the state statutes should be
enforced since an examination of the legislative history of Public Law SS-I0
and the award made thereunder did not dearly manifest a congressional intent
to pre-empt the state statutes. 35 It is a generally accepted principle that the
clear requirements of a statute cannot be overcome by legislative history. With
reference to this issue, a federal court has recently written: "The language of
the Act, Public Law 88-10S, and of the Award is plain and unambiguous, and
courts should
not resort to legislative history when the language of the statute
37
is clear."1

The second shortcoming inherent in the court's argument with respect to
the pre-emption issue is centered around its loose application of the principle
that, where congressional intent is lacking in a federal statute, a principal guideline in determining whether a state statute has been pre-empted is to consider
whether the enforcement of the state law would substantially conflict with the
policy promulgated under the federal law.38 By using a more pragmatic interpretation of this principle than the instant court did, 0 it can be argued that
the full crew laws have been superseded. In applying this test to the particular
facts of this case, it can be seen that the congressional policy promulgated by
Public Law 88-108 is being frustrated, since the petitioners cannot operate
under the lower requirements set by the award while the higher standards set
by the state full crew laws are enforced. The application of the statutes in
question defeats the full realization of the congressional policy and intent,
which was to allow the parties to carry out those issues, including crew requirements, which were agreed upon through collective bargaining.4 0
34. Id. at 109.
35. Id. at 114.
36. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S.
4S5, 492 (1947); Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 260 (1945).
37. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Hardin, 239 F. Supp. 1, 23 (W.D. Ark. 1965).

38. Federal legislation pre-empts state statutes which palpably infringe on its policy or
practical administration. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957); 3 MV v. Arlknas Oak
Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956); Penns ylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (19S6); Cloverleaf
Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 14S (1942); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 22S U.S. 115 (1913).
39. The instant court attempted to justify its holding by stating that the administration
and policy of Public Law SS-108 and the statutes in dispute were not in conflict since compliance with the higher standards set by the state statutes satisfied the federal statute and

the award made thereunder. 259 N.Y.S.2d at 109. In essence, the court reasored that the
state full crew laws should complement the award rather than be superseded by it. However,
in Iissouri Pac. R.R. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341, 346 (1927), the court stated that Congref-s has
supreme power to regulate commerce, and that, once that power has been executed through

legislation, state laws have no application. "They cannot be applied in coincidence with, as
complementary to or as in opposition to, federal enactments which disclose the intention of

Congress to enter a field of regulation that is within its jurisdiction." Ibid.
40.

See Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 353 U.S. 283 (1959); California v.
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By comparing and evaluating the effect which results from the administration
of the award and the state full crew laws, it clearly appears that greater flexibility and fairness can be attained in regulating train crew requirements by the
application of the provisions of the award. The purpose of the state full crew
laws was to provide safety and protection for the public from the manifest
danger of rail travel which undeniably existed when the statutes were enacted
several decades ago. However, these statutes, as they stand today, do not
reflect the present state of improved railroad technology and local operating
conditions which has eliminated many of the dangers which existed when the
statutes were enacted. The award, however, seems to solve this problem by
providing for a binding arbitration procedure whereby crew members to be
used in road, freight and yard crews are to be determined on a local basis by
special boards of adjustment. Through this procedure, crew requirements can
be determined with consideration given to present day conditions and to the
individual railroads. These criteria for determining crew requirements are
certainly less arbitrary and more flexible than the state full crew laws requirements which arbitrarily apply to all railroads of fifty miles or more regardless
of their individual technological improvements and safety precautions and
of the improved local operating and switching conditions.
Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd.,
330 U.S. 767 (1947); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). In
Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, supra, the court resolved the conflict between a
state statute and a collective bargaining award made pursuant to federal legislation which
expressed no congressional intent with respect to pre-emption. The court decided that the
state statute must be pre-empted, since to allow the application of the state law would
frustrate the congressional intent which was to allow the parties to conform to the award of
the collective bargaining agreement. Where federal legislation instructs parties to bargain
collectively, and an agreement is reached, the inconsistent application of state law is necessarily outside the power of the state. Id. at 295-96. In Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State
Labor Relations Bd., supra, the New York Board's ruling, with respect to a bargaining unit
in an industry, was held invalid since it conflicted with the policy lain down by the congressionally established NLRB. Where a state board and a federal board lay down conflicting policies in an area where the federal board has been authorized to act by Congress, the
federal policy is necessarily given effect as the supreme law of the land. Id. at 774.
There seems, however, to be one exception to this rule. Where the public is threatened with
breaches of the peace which may result in personal injury and/or property damage, it has
been held that the state may exercise its police powers even though Congress has entered the
field. In Allen-Bradley Local 1111, UEW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S.
740 (1942), where a state employment board had ordered a union, which was obstructing the
streets and roads, to desist from mass picketing of the employer's factory since such picketing
threatened personal injury and property damage, the Supreme Court held that, even though
Congress had authorized the NLRB to deal with such matters, the state board order was
not unconstitutional.
In Garner v. Local 776, Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953), the court stated that
the state may not exercise its police power since Congress had entered the field. However,
Garner emphasizes the fact that this was not "a case of mass picketing, threatening of employees, obstructing streets and highways . . . . Nothing suggests that the activity enjoined
[by the lower court] threatened a probable breach of the state's peace or would call for
extraordinary police measures by state or city authority." Ibid.
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Taxation-Legal Fees Expended in Unsuccessful Criminal Defense Held

Deductible as an Ordinary and Necessary Business Expense.-Petitioner a
securities dealer, was convicted for violating, and conspiring to violate,' the

fraud section of the Securities Act of 19332 and the mail fraud statute.3 He
deducted from his gross income the legal expenses 4 of his defense as an "ordinary
and necessary" business expense under Section 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. 5 The Commissioner disallowed the deduction and was upheld by
the Tax Court.6 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the expenses were
deductible despite petitioners adjudicated criminal behavior. Tdeicr v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965).

The Tax Court, in disallowing the deduction of the legal expenditures, followed
a long-standing precedent first established in Sarah Backer.- There, the taxpayer,
in the course of his business activity, bribed a union official. When subpoenaed
to testify, the taxpayer denied giving the bribe, but reversed himself before
leaving the witness stand. He was then indicted for perjury, but the case was
subsequently dismissed." The Commissioner and the Board of Tax Appeals
disallowed a deduction of the legal expenditures incurred in taxpayer's defense.
The Board reasoned that it was neither "ordinary" nor "necessary" to bribe or
to lie while carrying on a business and that any expenses resulting from those
activities are, therefore, of a personal, rather than a business, nature.0 Further,
the Board observed that public policy requires that "illegal" acts are not to be
sanctioned by the courts, even if the taxpayer is not convicted of any crime.10
Subsequent cases following the reasoning in Sarah Backer evolved the dearcut rule that legal fees expended in an unsuccessful defense of a criminal proceeding were not deductible regardless of the proximate relation between the
expense and the business.*' The latter cases in the Second Circuit are now
overruled.' 3
1. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
2. 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(a) (1964).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964).
4. There was no question as to the reasonableness of the amount ($22,964.20), nor that
the expense resulted from taxpayer's business rather than personal activities.
5. This section provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business ....
"
6. Walter F. Tellier, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Aem. 1052 (1963).
7. 1 B.T.A. 214 (1924).
S. Id. at 215.
9. Id. at 217.
10. Ibid. The court was inaccurate in calling taxpayers acts "illegal" since he was never
convicted of a crime.
11. The taxpayer in Sarah Backer, of course, had been successful, but the court conwidered
his acts immoral. Later cases narrowed the rule slightly so that only an unsuccezsful defense
would indicate immorality.
12. E.g., Peckham v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1964); Bell v. Commioner,
320 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1963); National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering 89
F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1937); Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d
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The instant court relied primarily on the principles expressed in the Supreme
Court case of Commissioner v. Heininger.14 Heininger, a Chicago dentist,
manufactured false teeth and sold them through the mail. The Postmaster
General, finding that Heininger had overstated the virtues of his product in his
mailed advertisements, issued a fraud order instructing the Postmaster of Chicago
to stamp all mail addressed to Heininger "fraudulent" and to have it returned
to the senders. 15 Without access to the mails, Heininger's business was virtually
worthless. He promptly brought suit against the Postmaster General seeking a
restraining injunction on the ground that there was no evidentiary basis for the
fraud order. He was ultimately unsuccessful.' His lawyer's fees and other
Cir. 1931); Thomas A. Joseph, 26 T.C. 562 (1956); John W. Thompson, 21 B.T.A. 568
(1930); Norvin R. Lindheim, 2 B.T.A. 229 (1925).
The results of courts making the distinctions between successful and unsuccessful, and
between civil and criminal, were often "anomalous, arbitrary, artificial and conflicting .... I
Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1965). For a more comprehensive discussion, see Arent, Inequities in Non-Deductibility of Fines, Penalties, Defense Expense, 87
J. Accountancy 482 (1949); Brookes, Litigation Expenses and the Income Tax, 12 Tax L.
Rev. 241 (1957); Note, Deduction of Business Expenses: Illegality and Public Policy, 54
Harv. L. Rev. 852 (1941); Note, Deductibility of Attorney's Fees Incurred in Defense of a
Criminal Prosecution, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 92 (1960); Note, Business Expenses, Disallowance,
and Public Policy: Some Problems of Sanctioning With the Internal Revenue Code, 72 Yale
L.J. 108 (1962).
One rule often adopted by- the courts is that a deduction for legal fees will not be allowed
whenever the courts disallow a deduction of the judgment taken against the taxpayer. Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178, 180 (2d Cir. 1931). That is, the
courts equated the payment of the legal fees with the payment of the penalty. This type of
thinking is often nothing more than begging the question. However, the rule is often disregarded. For example, in the case of a compromise settlement, the amount paid in settlement often is not deductible, but the legal expenditure is. E.g., Commissioner v. Longhorn
Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945). When a
consent decree is issued, the legal fees are deductible to the extent that the taxpayer has been
successful in resisting what was originally sought. National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc.
v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1937). Logically, the same rule should be applied to a
defendant who is convicted on only some of the counts in an indictment, but no case has
ever so held. See Note, Deductibility of Attorney's Fees Incurred in Defense of a Criminal
Prosecution, supra at 95. One of the chief advantages of the instant case's reversal Is the
elimination of these legal niceties.
13. However, the views expressed by the instant court are hardly novel. The position of
allowing the deduction of this type of expense first appeared in the dissent in Burroughs
Bldg. Material Co., 18 B.T.A. 101, 103-05 (1929), aff'd, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931). It was
argued that the tax law should be completely value-free, merely taxing the difference between
a business's gross receipts and gross expenditures without making any other determinations.
The dissent also argued that the legislative history of the Internal Revenue Code suggests
this position.
14. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
15. The Postmaster of Chicago was also ordered not to pay any money orders drawn to
Heininger. Id. at 469.
16. Heininger v. Farley, 105 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 587 (1939).
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legal expenses amounted to 36,600 dollars, an admittedly reasonable amount. 17
The Commissioner, disallowing the deduction of this amount from Heininger's
gross income, argued that it was not ordinary and necessary, nor could it be. for
a dentist to engage in fraudulent practices, and that, therefore, any expense
arising out of such fraud could not be an ordinary and necessry business expense.' 8 The Supreme Court explicitly rejected this argument as unsound and
held that, by any reasonable interpretation of the terms, Heininger's expenses
were "ordinary and necessary."'10 Threatened with the extinction of his business,
it certainly was not extraordinary to defend it with any means available. And
the expense was necessary since it represented the only hope of re-establishing
the businessYc0 The Court then went on to consider the public policy argument
against allowance of the deduction. "It has never been thought .. .that the
mere fact that an expenditure bears a remote relation to an illegal act makes it
non-deductible. The language of § 23(a) contAins no express reference to the
lawful or unlawful character of the business expenses which are declared to be
deductible." 21 Therefore, these expenses could only be held non-deductible if
the deduction would be contrary to some "sharply defined" public policy. The
only public policy involved was that of the mail fraud statute,-2 i.e., the policy
of protecting the public from fraud through the mail. It was not the policy of
this statute to levy any penalties on the individuals involved. Denying the deduction is, therefore, a penalty that has not been provided for by Congress. 2 3
The instant case held that petitioner's legal expenses were ordinary and
24
necessary as defined in Heininger.
However, Heiningcr had been consistently
distinguished because it dealt with expenses arising out of civil litigation. In
Anthony Cornero Stralla,25 the taxpayer was engaged in an unlawful gambling
enterprise and was not allowed to deduct the legal expenses of an unsuccessful
criminal defense. The Tax Court distinguished Hchiingcr on the basis that
Stralla's business was entirely illegal, while Heininger's was a legitimate business
with some illegal overtones.-" In a later case, Thomas A. Joseph,27 the Tax
Court, disallowing the deduction of legal expenses of an attorney convicted of
subornation of perjury, stated that the statutes involved in Heininger were for
the protection of the public and not for penalizing individuals2 8 while the
statute in Joseph was a penalizing statute. The court also distinguished civil
litigation expenses (Heininger) and criminal litigation expenses (Joseph) and
concluded: "This is indication to us that had the Supreme Court been confronted
17. 320 U.S. at 469.

IS. Id. at 471-72.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 471.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 474. Section 23(a) is now Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
39 U.S.C. §§ 4005, 4057 (1964).
320 U.S. at 474-75.
342 F.2d at 695.
9 T.C. Sol (1947).
Id. at S20.
26 T.C. 562 (1956).
Id. at 564.
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with a deduction claimed for expenses incurred in defending against conviction
for a crime which conviction eventuated, it would have reached a different
result in Heininger."29 Further, the court felt required to follow the old line
of cases until they had been explicitly overruled.30 It would seem that the
Joseph court relied on the mild factual distinction in Heininger to avoid following the principles therein expressed.
Heininger'sambiguity as to the relationship of public policy to "ordinary and
necessary" leaves room for divergent interpretations. However, from the
Court's reasoning, the implication is inescapable that public policy is not an
appropriate cause to hold an expense non-deductible unless that public policy
is "sharply defined." 3' 1 This point was amplified in the later case of Lilly v.
Commissioner,32 where petitioner, an optician, turned over one-third of the
retail price of his eyeglasses to the physicians who referred the clients to him.
He attempted to deduct the kickbacks as ordinary and necessary business
expenses, but the Commissioner ruled that public policy required a disallowance
of the deduction. The Commissioner's ruling was sustained by the Tax Court,a3
and the court of appeals affirmed.3 4 The Supreme Court, in reversing, first
pointed out that the expense was ordinary and necessary within the meaning
of Heininger since without the kickbacks there would have been no businessY3a
The Court then discussed the issue of public policy:
Assuming for the sake of argument that, under some circumstances, business expenditures which are ordinary and necessary in the generally accepted meanings of
those words may not be deductible as "ordinary and necessary" expenses under § 23
(a) (1) (A) when they "frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing
particular types of conduct,"

. . .

nevertheless the expenditures now before us do not

fall in that class. The policies frustrated must be national or state policies evidenced
by some governmental declaration of them. 36
The instant court argued that there is no such policy opposed to the hiring of
counsel and the incurring of other litigation expenses.37 In the absence of a
29.
30.

Ibid.
Ibid.

31. See 320 U.S. at 474.

32. 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
33. Thomas B. Lilly, 14 T.C. 1066 (1950).
34. Lilly v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1951).
35. 343 U.S. at 93-94.
36. Id. at 96-97.
37. The court indicated that such a policy, if it did exist, might be unconstitutional under
the sixth amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel. 342 F.2d at 694. This point was
further amplified in a concurring opinion by Chief Judge Lumbard, who noted that the
Supreme Court has recently expanded the meaning of the right to counsel and, therefore,
agreed that there is no policy discouraging the defense of criminal charges. Id. at 695-96.
However, the guarantee of the right to counsel does not seem to logically require the allowance of a deduction of the expense of counsel.
Judge Lumbard also pointed out that, in 1964, Congress enacted the Criminal Justice Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3006(a) (1964), providing compensation for counsel for indigent defendants In
criminal cases, regardless of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Judge Lumbard rea-
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policy, the only question is whether the expenses were ordinary and necessary as
defined in Heininger.35 The court held that they were and, therefore, allowed
the deduction.
This reasoning represents a complete shift of focus. The earlier cases, in
determining if an expense was deductible, looked at the crime out of which the
expense arose. The instant court looked at the act of hiring a lawyer and
indicated that the hiring, rather than the crime, is the act out of which the expense arosePz3 Though one might infer that this decision is a reflection of a
change in public policy,4 1 actually, only the court's notion of proximate relation
has changed. The Sarah Backer court questioned whether the charge of perjury
against the taxpayer was a proximate result of the taxpayer's business.4 1 The
court gave a negative answer, viewing the bribe and the lie as intervening causes
breaking the proximate relation between the business and the expense. 42 The
instant court is more realistic. "White-collar crime" is not infrequent, and is part
and parcel of many a business. Criminals, be they price-fixers or burglars, often
are apprehended, and it is only reasonable to expect them to defend themselves.
Therefore, the chain of causation from the business to the expense is unbroken.
It would appear, therefore, that the instant court reached the proper result.
However, it did not go far enough in its reasoning. The court allowed the deduction because it could find no public policy against incurring legal expenses 1
Apparently, the court would be willing to disallow deductions if it does find an
applicable public policy. There is no support for this view in the authorities cited
by the court. The Supreme Court, when discussing public policy in both Lilly
and Heininger,assumed, arguendo, that a deduction might be disallowed because
of public policy, and then found no policy requiring a deduction of the expenses
involved.44 The cases, therefore, do not lend any weight to the view that deductions may be disallowed on policy grounds. Also, the present court quotes two
comments on the legislative history of the Internal Revenue Code which indicate
that the sole purpose of tax law is to levy a tax on net incomeA3 These sources
maintain that the rules used to arrive at a measure of net income should be comsoned that "if the compensation of counsel under the Criminal Justice Act does not depend
on the success of the defense, it would seem to follow that the allov.ance of the deduction
should not depend on the outcome in cases where the defendant is able to and does assume
the financial burden of defending against criminal charges." 342 F.2d at 696.
38. Id. at 695.

39. See id. at 694.
40. It is highly unlikely that earlier courts had a policy of discouraging the defense of
criminal charges. If they did, the policy only manifested itself when the defense was unsuccessful. Of course, it is possible that some highly unconventional judges felt that only the
innocent have a right to counsel. If this is so, the feeling was never strong enough to be
expressed in any decision.
41. Sarah Backer, 1 B.T.A. 214, 216 (1924).

42. See id. at 216-17.
43. 342 F.2d at 695.
44. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 97 (1952); Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 US.
467, 474 (1943).
45. 342 F.2d at 692-93.
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pletely free of any moral considerations. 46 Thus, apparently the court could have
held that petitioner's legal expenses are deductible because all ordinary and
necessary business expenses (as defined in Heininger) are deductible regardless
of any policy considerations. Instead, the court rather timidly concluded that it
found "no sharply defined public policy against the allowance of such deductions, 1 47 and, therefore, that petitioner's legal expenses were deductible.
It would seem that Heininger,Lilly, and Tellier are all landmark cases which
refused to disallow a deduction on public policy grounds. However, the
Tellier court still followed the old procedure of casting about for a public
policy, and only allowed the deduction when it found none applicable. It is this
procedure that the court should have struck down. If Congress wishes to penalize
certain conduct by disallowing a deduction of the expenses arising out of such
conduct, then Congress may so provide in the Internal Revenue Code. In the
absence of such legislation, courts should look no further and should allow the
deduction of proximately related business expenses as a matter of course.

Trade Regulation-Sales-Commission Agreement Held Unfair Method
of Competition.-The Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint against
defendants alleging unfair methods of competition in violation of Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.' Defendants, Atlantic Refining Company and Goodyear Tire Company, were parties to a sales-commission agreement
which governed the sale of Goodyear tires, batteries and accessories to Atlantic's
various dealers and wholesalers. By the terms of the agreement, Atlantic would
"cencourage" its dealers and wholesalers to buy only Goodyear tires, batteries
and accessories. In return for this "encouragement," Goodyear would pay Atlantic a commission 2 on all auto supplies purchased by Atlantic's dealers and
wholesalers. The hearing examiner found that, in initiating this plan, Atlantic
had coerced its dealers into carrying only Goodyear supplies and, accordingly,
the examiner enjoined any further use of coercive tactics toward this end. The
Federal Trade Commission approved this finding but also held that the salescommission plan itself was illegal, 3 finding it to be, "a classic example of the use
46. Ibid.
47. Id. at 695.
1. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). Actions similar to this one
had previously been brought under the Sherman Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964); Clayton Act § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964);
or both. For a discussion of the relationship of the three acts, see Oppenhelm, Guides to
Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act With the Sherman and Clayton
Acts, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 821 (1961).
2. Atlantic received a 10% commission on all sales to its dealers and a 7.5%o commission
on sales to its wholesalers. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 365 (1965).
3. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309 (1961). In recent years, sales-commission
agreements have been a favorite tool of the oil companies for marketing tires, batteries
and accessories. See 30 Fordham L. Rev. 380, 382 (1961).
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of economic power in one market ... to destroy competition in another market
.... " Atlantic did not contest the findings of the hearing examiner, but contended that the Commission had gone too far in holding the sales-commission
plan illegal even when stripped of the previously employed overt coercive tactics.
The court of appeals and the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission. Atlantic
Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
It is clear that the findings of the hearing examiner were correct. 6 Indeed,
as the Supreme Court noted, the effectiveness of the program was clearly shown
by the results achieved in a relatively short time; within seven months of the
start of the program, Goodyear had signed up over 95 per cent of Atlantic's
dealers. 7 In addition, the Supreme Court followed the Commission's decision
to enjoin Atlantic from entering into a sales-commission agreement with any
other distributor of tires, batteries and accessories, and to enjoin Goodyear
from entering into similar agreements with any other oil company.8 Mr. Justice
Goldberg, dissenting, argued against the broadness of the order and contended
that the Commission did not have sufficient facts before it to show that the
sales-commission agreement was an inherently unfair method of competition.0
It would appear that the order was not too broad in light of the facts or
the law. 10 The order was in keeping with the very purpose of the Commission.
Orders of the Commission are not punitive in nature, but are issued to prevent
future illegal practices. In order to accomplish this, the Commission cannot
be limited in its remedy to the narrow infraction directly before it, but must
strike at the roots of the infraction, closing all roads towards the prohibited
goal."
In the case at hand, even absent direct coercion by Atlantic on its dealers,
the very nature of the economic relationship between them is potentially
coercive. i'- Once the oil company takes an economic interest in the distribution
of tires, batteries and accessories, the dealers, by virtue of their subservient
economic positions, must adhere to its policies.' 3 While admitting that
4. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., SS F.T.C. 309, 367 (1961).
5. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1964).

6. Atlantic threatened its dealers with termination of their leases and other economic
penalties for failure to stock only Goodyear tires, batteries and accessories. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., SS F.T.C. 309, 342-45 (1961).
7. 381 U.S. at 366.
S. Id. at 361-62 nn.2 & 3.
9. Id. at 382-91 (dissenting opinion).
10. But see 63 Mlich. L. Rev. 713 (1965).
11. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952); accord, FTC v. Motion Picture
Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S.
683, 708 (1948).
12. See Tezaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (WYashington, J.,
dissenting) and cases cited therein.
13. Among the sources of leverage in Atlantic's bands were its lease and equipment
loan contracts containing cancellation and short term provisions, control of the dealers'
supply of gasoline and oil, and extensive control of all advertising on the dealers' premises.

3S1 U.S. at 368. A somewhat analagous situation is presented by Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,
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coercive tactics had been employed, 14 Atlantic reasoned that, since it and its
dealers were mutually dependent, the sales-commission agreement could be
executed without coercion. 15 However, if that were true, Goodyear would have
little need for the sales-commission agreement or any other arrangement with
Atlantic.'" It could fend for itself, selling to Atlantic's dealers in direct competition with other marketers of auto supplies. It seems obvious that the
primary need that Goodyear has for Atlantic is the influence which Atlantic
enjoys over its dealers.
Further, when viewed in its broader aspects, this plan would appear to be
essentially a tying arrangement, which is an agreement by a party to sell a
product on the condition that the purchaser also purchase a different, or tied,
product if he is to buy at all. 17 However, the Court did not see fit to classify
the sales-commission agreement as a tying agreement:
We recognize that the Goodyear-Atlantic contract is not a tying arrangement.
Atlantic is not required to tie its sale of gasoline and other petroleum products to
purchases of Goodyear tires, batteries and accessories. Nor does it expressly require
such purchases of its dealers.' 8
In spite of this pronouncement, much of the reasoning of the Court is based
on the principles applicable to tying agreements. Indeed, previous cases on
similar facts have held such plans to be tying arrangements. 9
A brief comparison with some of the characteristics of tying agreements
indicates that, in effect, such an agreement is present here. A tying agreement
need not be expressly set forth but may be deduced from the parties' course
of conduct. 20 Thus, the fact that Atlantic does not "expressly require" its dealers
to purchase tires, batteries and accessories would not seem to be controlling
in determining whether the sales-commission agreement was a tie-in. Atlantic's
course of conduct would seem to indicate that its dealers were effectively required to carry Goodyear supplies.
The Court's position that the agreement was not a tying arrangement seems
377 U.S. 13 (1964), in which the oil company utilized these very methods of coercion in
conjunction with a consignment agreement whereby the oil company fixed the retail prices
at which the dealers were permitted to sell gasoline. The Court found such agreement
illegal and upheld the granting of summary judgment. For a further discussion of the
Simpson case, see 33 Fordham L. Rev. 336 (1964).
14. 381 U.S. at 363.
15. Id. at 368.
16. Id. at 376.
17. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
18. 381 U.S. at 369.
19. E.g., Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
993 (1964); Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 963 (1961); United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951),
aff'd per curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952) ; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305
n.8 (1949) (dictum).
20. Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 19; McElhenny Co. v. Western Auto
Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959).
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untenable. As previously indicated, if Atlantic did not require such purchases
of its dealers, there would be little reason for Goodyear to be interested in such
an arrangement. As stated by the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United
'

States 21
Tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.... In the usual case only the prospect of reducing competition would persuade
a seller to adopt such a contract and only his control of the supply of the tying
device.., could induce a buyer to enter one. 2This seems to be apt description of the agreement under consideration, even
absent the extensive findings of fact which Mr. Justice Goldberg would require.
Indeed, such findings are unnecessary in determining the extent of a tying
arrangementP
It would appear that a more fundamental tie-in is present here. Even assuming that the sale of tires, batteries and accessories were not tied to the sale of
gasoline and oil, it is apparent that their sale was tied to the leasing of the
stations themselves. When Atlantic utilized direct coercion, it did not specifically
threaten to stop selling gasoline to its dealers, but rather threatened to cancel
their leases.2 4 Viewed in this light, the case is similar to Northern Par.Ry. v.
United States, 25 in which the Supreme Court held an analagous agreement to
be a tie-in and, as such, per se illegal.
What makes a tie-in agreement per se illegal? The criteria are laid down
in International Salt Co. v. United States20 and subsequent cases. - A "not
insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce has to be affected and restraint
of free competition in the tied product must result. The vice of tying agreements lies in economic power in one market restraining free competition in
another market.2 s In InternationalSalt Co., the market foreclosed was 5C0,00
21. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
22. Id. at 305-06.
23. It is seldom necessary in such a case to embark on a full-scale factual inquiry to
determine the scope of the market affected or the particular seller's status in that market.
These criteria may be inferred from the character of the products and the relationship of
the parties involved. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 3S, 45 (1962).
24. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 53 F.T.C. 309, 342-43 (1961).
25. 356 U.S. 1 (1958). The railroad leased certain lands to various lessees. In return
for the lease, the lessees agreed to ship over the railroad's lines all commoditie3 produced
or manufactured on the land, provided that the railroad's rates (and, in some instances,
its service) were equal to those of competing carriers. It should be noted that in the
instant case the dealers had no choice even if the competing products were better or
less expensive.
26. 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
27. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (195S); Times-Piscayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 US.
293 (1949); cf. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). For a good discussion of the development of tie-in cases and further clarification of the per se illegality
doctrine, see Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 72
Harv. L. Rev. 50 (1958).
28. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (195S).
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dollars annually. The sale of tires, batteries and accessories involved in the
instant case exceeded 11,000,000 dollars annually, certainly not an "Insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce. Similarly, the free competition of auto
supplies had been restrained. Not only were all dealers other than Goodyear
excluded from the Atlantic market, but Goodyear outlets themselves could not
sell to Atlantic stations which were not in their designated district.29 Thus,
whether viewed as a tying arrangement or as inherently coercive, it would
seem that the Court had ample justification for holding the sales-commission
agreement to be illegal.
Mr. Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion, noted that the sales-commission plan did not confer any distinctive coercive power on Atlantic.80 He concluded that, absent any such finding, there was no basis for holding the plan
illegal since equal coercive power would have existed under the prior plan of
distribution. 81 Prior to 1951, when the sales-commission plan went into effect,
Atlantic marketed its tires, batteries and accessories through a plan known as
the purchase-resale plan. Under this plan, Atlantic would purchase the required
tires, batteries and accessories, store them, and sell them to its dealers as
required. It would appear that such a plan contains the same coercive factors
as -the sales-commission plans. 32 Atlantic's economic interest in auto supplies
is even greater under the purchase-resale plan than under the sales-commission
plan. The former requires a large capital investment, along with storage and
administrative expenses not present in the latter. Thus, failure of the purchaseresale plan would involve a loss of capital, not just a loss of potential income
(commissions) as would be the case under the sales-commission plan.'"
It is not the type of plan employed which is inherently coercive, since the
same economic imbalance is present with either, but the improper manipulation
of the economic imbalance which must be guarded against. Such a result can
be realized only by excluding the oil companies from the marketing of tires,
batteries and accessories entirely. Removal of the oil company's economic incentive removes its desire to curb free competition among the marketers of
these products.
29. Goodyear divided the Atlantic stations into various districts and assigned one of
its wholesale outlets to each district.
30. 381 U.S. at 378 (dissenting opinion).
31. Id. at 379 (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Goldberg also criticized the majority's
failure to draw a distinction between the two plans. Id. at 386 (dissenting opinion).
32. Mr. justice Goldberg, in discussing the Court's failure to distinguish the two plans,
indicated that the heart of the violation, i.e., the utilization of economic power in one
market to destroy the competition in another, is present with either plan. "Indeed, it would
seem difficult to draw any distinction between the two plans on this basis." Id. at 387
(dissenting opinion). But see United States v. Sun Oil Co., 176 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa.
1959), where the purchase-resale plan itself was not declared illegal, but coercive tactics
similar to those under consideration were found to exist.
33. The Court did not consider this question, stating that "the merits of the purchaseresale plan, however, were not before the Commission and we therefore have no occasion
to pass upon them." 381 U.S. at 372.

